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We analyze the strategic behavior of ﬁrms when demand is determined
by a rule of thumb behavior of consumers. We assume consumer dynamics
where individual consumers follow simple behavioral decision rules governed
by imitation and habit as suggested in consumer research. On this basis, we
investigate monopoly and competition between ﬁrms, described via an open-
loop diﬀerential game which in this setting is equivalent to but analytically
more convenient than a closed-loop system. We derive a Nash equilibrium and
examine the inﬂuence of advertising. We show for the monopoly case that a
reduction of the space of all price paths in time to the space of time-constant
prices is sensible since the latter in general contains Nash equilibria. We prove
that the equilibrium price of the weakest active ﬁrm tends to marginal cost
as the number of (non-identical) ﬁrms grows. Our model is consistent with
observed market behavior such as product life cycles.
JEL Classiﬁcation Number: C61, C62, C79, L11, L21, M31, M37
Keywords: Bounded rationality, social learning, population game, diﬀerential game,
product life cycle, monopoly, competition, pricing, advertising
1. Introduction
In many situations, strategic pricing represents a diﬃcult task for ﬁrms, especially
if the consumers are not known to strictly follow a given demand function. In
reality, however, consumers behave boundedly rationally as observed in numerous
psychological and experimental investigations (cf. Conlisk 1996) and appreciated
in some areas of industrial organization (cf. Ellison 2006). In the present work,
we examine a model which describes how ﬁrms shall optimally, i.e. strategically,
set their prices or advertising levels when confronted with habitual imitative con-
sumers. Such consumers either imitate popular product choices or form a habit and
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repeatedly purchase the same product. This rule of thumb behavior is psycholog-
ically supported (Assael 1984) and acknowledged in the economic literature (e.g.
Stigler and Becker 1977, Schlag 1998).
The demand side of a market with habitual imitative consumers has been examined
in a companion paper (Matzke and Wirth 2008). There we have shown—using imi-
tation and habit as the only model ingredients—under which conditions a product is
feasible (i.e. has suﬃcient demand to survive lastingly on the market), which types
of sales curves can be generated, and how the imitative and habitual parameters
inﬂuence feasibility and sales evolution. The corresponding model has been stated
in form of a population game as deﬁned in Sandholm (2005), using the fact that for
a large population size the stochastic process generated by the evolutionary process
can be approximated by solutions to ordinary diﬀerential equations (Bena¨ ım and
Weibull 2003).
For a complete market description, the demand side is here complemented with
a supply side model. The demand side consists of the continuous-time consumer
population game from Matzke and Wirth (2008). The game of the supply side
describes the strategic behavior of ﬁrms, which anticipate the consumers’ behavior
and thus the demand dynamics. With such a description at hand, we can then
transfer the concept of welfare into this framework, examine how advertising might
inﬂuence the results, and show that the model is consistent with observed market
patterns such as product life cycles.
As motivated in Matzke and Wirth (2008), in a consumer–seller relationship the
strategic variables (e.g. price, quality, output) are determined by the ﬁrms. Any
inﬂuencing parameter on the demand side (such as personal preference or reservation
price) is ﬁxed, i.e. exogenous in a market model. Hence, due to their reactive role,
consumers naturally do not compete actively with each other or with ﬁrms, which
prohibits a conventional game theoretic demand side model. In contrast, for the
ﬁrms a strategic behavior of determining the degrees of freedom can be devised
using game theoretic approaches. In particular, we apply a diﬀerential game in
order to model the ﬁrms’ behavior.
This paper aims at providing an insight into the strategic response of ﬁrms when
confronted with demand dynamics generated by the imitative and habitual con-
sumer behavior. The consumer model is in the spirit of Smallwood and Conlisk
(1979) as well as von Thadden (1992) in that the consumers are unable or not will-
ing to act strategically and thus act adaptively. Our rational supply side approach
diﬀers in methodology. We employ a normal form game in which ﬁrms choose a
price path at the beginning of the game and gain an according proﬁt. (This could
easily be extended to repeated choices of price paths.) A more classic normal form
game, which describes a single discrete time step, would not exploit the full richness
of the model since the time-continuous demand side calls for at least a continuous-
time price path. At the other extreme, a steady price adjustment at all points in
time is rather unrealistic since a ﬁrm can hardly react continuously without timeC. Matzke
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lag (though, nonetheless, the proposed model will be able to capture even this case).
By letting the ﬁrms ﬁx a price path at the beginning of the game (e.g. for a certain
time period, which is represented by the duration of the game), we strike a balance
between both extremes.
We employ a diﬀerential game, i.e. a time-continuous game where the state variables
(here the consumer subpopulation sizes) follow ﬁrst-order ordinary diﬀerential equa-
tions. More speciﬁcally, the chosen product prices (control variables) determine the
rate of change in consumer subpopulation sizes (state variables), where consumers
are grouped into subpopulations according to the product they own. Technically,
there is no eﬀect in the opposite direction, which renders the dynamics an open-loop
system. However, in a deterministic setting we have equivalence of open and closed
loops. This is convenient since closed loops are considered—in contrast to static
open loops—as being genuinely strategic since they comprise a feedback in which
the control variables are aﬀected by the state variables.
In this context, the following result turns out to be very interesting: The ﬁrms’
action space generally contains all possible price paths and thus is very complex.
However, for a monopoly we will show that a Nash equilibrium often lies in the re-
duced space of time-constant prices. This justiﬁes that most of the time we return to
time-constant price paths and steady state analysis. Nevertheless, we additionally
analyze some exemplary cases with general price paths. Moreover, we will see that
markets with imitative and habitual consumers behave naturally in that e.g. an in-
creasing number of ﬁrms enhances competition and reduces prices. However, perfect
competition is generally only achieved in symmetric markets. Finally, advertising
is shown to be an eﬀective method to sustain demand, and a welfare deﬁnition is
suggested.
1.1. Further motivation and related literature
Boundedly rational consumer behavior—as advocated by Ellison (2006), Conlisk
(1996), and many others—is often observed in consumer research, in particular
imitation of group behavior or habitual purchase (cf. Assael 1984, p. 371ﬀ, 53). Just
to mention some exemplary laboratory experiments, Venkatesan (1966) shows that
consumers generally conform to group norms. Pingle and Day (1996) summarize
experiments which show that boundedly rational behavior such as imitation and
habit (which they call “economic choices in reality”) represents means in order to
get well-performing economic choices in presence of decision costs. Our focus here
lies on markets with boundedly rational consumers that follow habitual imitative
decision rules as introduced in Matzke and Wirth (2008).
Closely related to the demand dynamic employed here is the model by Smallwood
and Conlisk (1979). They consider consumers who buy the same product each
period until a breakdown occurs. Then, they choose another product depending
on its market share. It is examined how strongly the consumers should rely on
product popularities. Despite having been published in 1979 already, there is stillC. Matzke
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social learning literature building on this model, for example Ellison and Fudenberg
(1995).
Imitative behavior in general constitutes a well-known and frequently used concept
in evolutionary game theory and social learning, compare for instance Schlag (1998),
Ellison and Fudenberg (1993), and Banerjee (1992), just to name a few notable
papers. Habit, on the other hand, occurs in the habit formation literature (Heaton
1993) as well as implicitly in some industrial organization models (for instance
in Smallwood and Conlisk 1979, where habit is implicitly formed as long as no
breakdown occurs). Habit may also be interpreted as a special case of learning,
since agents learn from past experience (Sobel 2000, p.257) and positive experience
with a good may cause habitual purchase behavior.
Firms are usually more rational than consumers can or aim to be. The reason lies
in the large number of agents and equipment that are employed in order to avoid
costly wrong decisions. The approximation of rational ﬁrms seems reasonable, even
though some early work in the ﬁeld of bounded rationality assumes the opposite,
i.e. boundedly rational ﬁrms (e.g. Rothschild 1947, Cyert and March 1956). How-
ever, in line with most of the recent literature, we restrict bounded rationality to
the consumers and to assume fully rational ﬁrms (Ellison 2006, p. 4). We will stick
to this convention, i.e. our ﬁrms aim at maximizing their proﬁts given the demand
side and the pricing strategies of the competitors which is modeled via a diﬀeren-
tial game as introduced by Isaacs (1954). In combination with the two previously
mentioned simple rule of thumb ingredients, imitation and habit by consumers, the
model will be able to generate typical patterns observed in consumer markets such
as product life cycles (de Kluyver 1977, Brockhoﬀ 1967, Polli and Cook 1969).
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 recapitulates the consumer model,
deﬁning the consumers’ behavioral rules and deducing the resulting demand dy-
namics. Subsequently, section 3 introduces the competition game played by the
supply side. The game is ﬁrst applied to exemplary monopoly or oligopoly settings,
after which more general results and conclusions are drawn for the monopoly and
oligopoly case. In section 4, an adequate welfare deﬁnition is provided, and a pos-
sible generation of product life cycles is described. Additionally, a model extension
by advertising is suggested. Finally, we conclude in section 5.
2. Model for boundedly rational demand side
In a preceding article, we introduced an approach to model boundedly rational
consumers and analyzed the resulting demand dynamics (Matzke and Wirth 2008).
Before we model the ﬁrms’ strategic response to this demand side, let us brieﬂy
recapitulate the consumer model. For details we refer to Matzke and Wirth (2008).C. Matzke
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2.1. Methodology
The methodology applied builds upon the work of Sandholm (2006) and consists
mainly of a population game with a particular choice of a conditional switch rate.
Each consumer owns at most one unit of n possible products. A consumer owning
good i is equipped with an independent Poisson alarm clock of rate Ri, i.e. an alarm
clock which rings after an exponentially distributed time with expected value R
−1
i .
Each time the alarm rings (which is associated with a broken product), the consumer
switches to product j with switching probability pij =
ρij
Ri . If the consumer does
not own a product yet, the alarm clock signalizes an arising interest in buying a
good. Typically, the frequency R0 of revisions without any good is larger than the
rate Ri of possible replacements of good i, since the goods usually survive longer
than the consumers without any good are satisﬁed.
Let us denote ρij(x,t) the conditional switch rate from product i to product j at
time t and state x = (x1,...,xn) (where xi denotes the market share of consumers
owning product i). Obviously, Ri =
 n
j=0 ρij(x,t) (where subscript 0 stands for
consumers without any good).
The switching rates and probabilities of course depend on the product prices, and
exactly this dependence will later form the instrument via which ﬁrms exert an
inﬂuence on consumer behavior during their competition. However, the price de-
pendence is not necessary to understand the dynamics of the demand side. Hence,
the reader may implicitly understand all parameters to depend on the product
prices, but this dependence will not be introduced explicitly until the treatment of
the supply side.
The previous deﬁnitions characterize a population game with all potential con-
sumers as players (Matzke and Wirth 2008). This game uniquely determines a







ρij(x,t), xi(0) = x0
i, i = 0,...,n. (1)
We deﬁne the sales of product i, Si(t), as the number of units of product i ∈




xj(t)ρji(x(t),t), i = 0,...,n, (2)
where N denotes the number of possible consumers. Using mean dynamic (1), we
obtain a relation between sales and consumer subpopulations,






= ˙ xi + xiRi, i = 0,...,n. (3)C. Matzke
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2.2. Consumer dynamics
Now only the switching probabilities pij(x,t) =
ρij(x,t)
Ri remain to be speciﬁed. Of
those people who do not own any product, the fraction of consumers deciding to
buy product i is described by p0i. Consumers’ choices are sensitive to market shares
or popularities of the products (Smallwood and Conlisk 1979): When consumers
passively encounter a product, its level of familiarity rises, thus increasing the pos-
sibility for this product to be bought. Consumers may also actively imitate others
in buying the same good since the popularity of a product might give information
about the product’s past performance (Ellison and Fudenberg 1993). As discussed
in Matzke and Wirth (2008) a linear relation
p0i = ϕixi, i  = 0, (4)
seems to be a good modeling approach. ϕi ∈ [0,1] generally diﬀers from product to
product (Assael 1984, p. 432, 414) and can even be time dependent. It constitutes
the accumulated inﬂuence of product frequency on the consumers’ purchase decision
via diﬀerent mechanisms and can be interpreted as an anticipated product quality.
Of course, ϕi depends on the good’s properties as there are the price, the (expected)
quality, the strength of networking and fashion eﬀects for that product etc.
Let us now turn to those people owning product i. Someone who is content with
that good tends to buy a new unit of the same good, even though a better product
might exist. Assael (1984, p. 53) summarizes several studies on the topic and comes
to the conclusion that a form of habit evolves, leading to repeat purchases of a
product without further information search or evaluating brand alternatives. Hence
we assume a ﬁxed, product-speciﬁc percentage of consumers to develop a buying
habit so that
pii = si ∈ [0,1], i  = 0. (5)
The fraction of switching consumers (1 − pii) divides up into the fractions pij of
people switching to product j  = i. They behave just like those consumers not yet
owning any good, i.e.
pij = (1 − pii)p0j = (1 − si)ϕjxj, i  = 0 ∧ j  = 0,i. (6)
The switching probabilities pi0 and p00 are now uniquely determined by the con-
straints
 n
j=0 pij = 1 and
 n
j=0 p0j = 1.
For i = 1,...,n, the mean dynamic (1) eventually takes the form
˙ xi = xi
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where Ψi := 1 − Ri
R0
1−si
ϕi and Φi := 1 − Ri
R0(1 − si) stand for “quality” and “habit
induction” of product i.
All constants Ri, ϕi and si may in principle (and will later) be time-dependent so
that product modiﬁcations or fashion trends can be modeled.
Population games with the switching probabilities as deﬁned above will represent
the demand side of our market model. Let us hence deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Habitual imitative consumers). Agents who behave according to
the above model with switching probabilities (4) to (6) are called habitual imitative
consumers. A population game with such agents is called the demand side of a
market with habitual imitative consumers.
3. Strategic pricing in a monopoly & oligopoly
After having repeated the framework of the demand side model, let us now examine
markets in which ﬁrms anticipate the consumers’ actions (indeed, companies do try
to predict consumer behavior) and set their prices accordingly.
Naturally, the imitation factor ϕi and habit coeﬃcient si depend on the good prices,
i.e. ϕi = ϕi(ξ1(t),...,ξn(t)), si = si(ξ1(t),...,ξn(t)), i = 1,...,n, where the price
of good j at time t is denoted ξj(t). To keep things simple while staying suﬃciently
realistic, we shall assume ϕi and si to depend on ξi only. The consumers see
the prices of all goods, and the probability to buy product i (encoded by ϕi and
si) rises with falling price ξi. They behave like many small iron particles which
are attracted by diﬀerent magnets, representing the products. The strength of
a magnet relative to its competitors determines the eventual amount of trapped
particles, which illustrates the mechanism of competition. Competing ﬁrms will
seek a compromise between large margins and suﬃciently low prices to attract
consumers more strongly than their competitors (via high ϕi and si).
Recall that the imitation function has the following interpretation: A consumer
owning no good or switching product imitates the population of consumers own-
ing good i with probability ϕi(ξi). Equivalently, the fraction ϕi(ξi) of the whole
population would purchase good i at a price of ξi. Obviously, ϕi(ξi) represents the
normalized demand function of product i, or in probabilistic terms, ϕi(ξi) is the
demand distribution of product i. Hence, let us agree upon the following
Condition 3.1. In a market with habitual imitative consumers, let ϕi(  ξ) and si(  ξ)
denote the imitation and habit coeﬃcient for product i, depending on the vector
  ξ=(ξ1,...,ξn) of product prices. Then ϕi and si are monotonously decreasing in ξi.
In the following we will abbreviate vectors of scalars according to (σi)i=1,...,m =   σ.
We are now able to describe a normal form competition game of the ﬁrms.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Normal form competition game). The normal form competition
game in a market with habitual imitative consumers is a normal form game G =
(n,S,Π) withC. Matzke
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• the number of agents n being the number of ﬁrms, where each ﬁrm produces one
product and the products are understood to be characterized by the functions
si(ξ1,...,ξn) and ϕi(ξ1,...,ξn),




+ ×   ×R
R+
+
(a subset of the space of n-tuples over maps ξi : R+ → R+, t  → ξi(t), where
ξi(t) denotes the price of good i at time t),
• the utility function Π : S → Rn




  s(  ξ(t)),   ϕ(  ξ(t)),  x(t)
  
,
being the ﬁrms’ proﬁt, where there are no ﬁxed costs, ci denotes the (time-
independent) marginal cost of production for good i, and   S(  s(  ξ(t)),   ϕ(  ξ(t)),  x(t)) ≡
  S(t,  x(0)) is the sales vector (cf. (2)) belonging to the population game (7) with
ρ deﬁned by (4) to (6). The operator F : RR+ → R+, which assigns a non-
negative real number to each map f : R+ → R, may assume diﬀerent forms.
The imitation and habit function   ϕ(  ξ) and   s(  ξ) may in general be time dependent.












For a zero discount rate r, the latter deﬁnition is not well-deﬁned. In this case we
resort to the long-term proﬁt rate,









where the last expression only holds for time-invariant prices in the steady state.
In this case (which is for example of interest when the ﬁrms would like to validate
their prices in an equilibrated market), we will also denote F∂ as the steady state
proﬁt.
Note that 3.2 in conjunction with (7) deﬁnes a diﬀerential game as in Isaacs (1954).
Deﬁnition 3.2 allows for a time dependent price. The ﬁrms set their price paths
initially and then strictly follow these. The lack of opportunities for price path
revisions implies no disadvantage for the ﬁrms, since the consumer model is deter-
ministic and consumer behavior thus predictable. Therefore, even if the ﬁrms would
be able to change their prices during the game, they would not do so unless the
market conditions were changed by an external event. (Such price path revisions
could readily be modeled by extending the normal form competition game to aC. Matzke
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repeated game.) Put diﬀerently, assume the optimal pricing strategies to be func-
tions of the state also, i.e.   ξ =   ξ(  x,t), which would correspond to the closed-loop
case. Then, the corresponding optimal path in state space,   x(t), could be computed
by solving the mean dynamic (7). Choosing ˆ ξ(t) =   ξ(  x(t),t), we obtain the optimal
open-loop control path, which is exactly equivalent to the corresponding closed-loop
path. (Note that this would be diﬀerent for models with non-Markovian strategies
and positive time lags between a ﬁrm’s action and the others’ reaction, in which
case trigger strategies, i.e. punishment after path deviation of a competitor, might
exist, cf. Dockner, Jørgensen, Van Long, and Sorger (2001).)
Obviously, ﬁrms do not at each time maximize their current proﬁt, but choose their
price paths in order to obtain an optimal overall proﬁt in the long run.
3.1. Monopoly
As a ﬁrst illustrative example, let us consider the simplest case possible, the monopoly
with ﬁxed prices (as in equilibrated or price-restricted markets). The monopoly
strategy space thus reduces to the space S = R+ of time-constant price func-
tions ξ1(t) = ξ1. For given ϕ1(ξ1), s1(ξ1) the Nash equilibrium with steady state
proﬁt now yields an optimum monopoly price (corresponding oligopoly prices are
addressed in the next section).
Example 3.1 (Steady state monopoly price). Consider the normal form competi-
tion game






with S = R+ representing the set of all constant price functions in R+. Let us
assume a constant habit function s1 and the generic piecewise aﬃne imitation func-






with maximum reservation price Ξ1 ≥ c1. The price

















the ordinary diﬀerential equation (7). The optimal price is given by
ξ∗




(1 − s1)Ξ1(Ξ1 − c1) if ξ∗
1 > c1.
For ξ∗
1 < c1 the ﬁrm is recommended not to produce. The product therefore is






Of course, the constant s1 in the above example is a very crude approximation
(though reasonable if a certain range of prices is not exceeded), since then, obviously,
1This is just a diﬀerent representation of the feasibility condition Ψ1[ξ1 = c1] > 0 from Matzke
and Wirth (2008).C. Matzke
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the monopolist could gain inﬁnite proﬁt by suddenly charging inﬁnite prices (which
the consumers will pay due to their habit). Hence, when looking at time dependent
prices, one should for example set s1(ξ1) = ϕ1(ξ1).
A product is feasible if it persists in the steady state and the ﬁrm does not make
any losses when selling the good. The feasibility condition from the above example
naturally extends to a result for general ϕ1(ξ1) and s1(ξ1).
Proposition 3.1. The single product on the market with habitual imitative con-
sumers is feasible if and only if Ψ1[ξ1 = c1] > 0.
Proof. Due to condition 3.1, ϕ1 and s1 are monotonously decreasing with ξ1. Hence,
Ψ1 is so as well. Also, Matzke and Wirth (2008) have shown that a single product
on a market is feasible if and only if Ψ1 > 0. Hence, if and only if Ψ1[ξ1 = c1] > 0,
there exist prices ξ1 for which the ﬁrm makes a positive proﬁt.
The previous example of an equilibrated monopoly market did not exploit the pos-
sibility of time-varying prices. Yet, it might very well be that non-constant prices
result in a higher proﬁt: A widely observed pricing strategy consists in charging
an elevated price most of the time with (more or less regular) intermittent special
oﬀers. This strategy probably aims at making people buy the product during the
low-price period and thereby inducing a habit for the high-price period. However,
for periodic price changes we will show that in a market with habitual imitative
consumers a Nash equilibrium is found to lie in the space of time-constant prices,
which in many cases justiﬁes to a priori conﬁne ourselves to steady states and con-
stant pricing. To show this, we will proceed in steps and ﬁrst prove the criticality,
later the optimality of a constant price.
Proposition 3.2. Let us consider a monopoly market with habitual imitative con-
sumers in which the ﬁrm has a periodic price path, i.e. in each time period [kT,kT+
T],k ∈ N, the same price path ξ1(t) = ξ1(t+T) = ξ1(t+2T) =     is pursued. The













assuming that a periodic state, i.e. a state with x1(t) = x1(t + T) =    , has been
reached. Then, the proposed proﬁt operator indeed yields the average proﬁt per
time. (Instead, proﬁt F∂ could equivalently be used.) Then, if the good is feasible, a
constant price is a critical value for the monopoly.
Proof. For simplicity, we abbreviate R := R1
R0 and skip the index 1 for all other
variables. Also, we will introduce the non-dimensional time ˆ t = R0t and ˆ T = R0T,
where for ease of notation, the hats are dropped in the following.
Let ξ(t) be periodic with period T and assume that after some equilibration time,
all other system variables also behave periodically with same period.C. Matzke
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The non-dimensionalized ordinary diﬀerential equation ˙ x = xϕ(Ψ−x) is of Riccati
type and thus readily solved for x,
x =
exp























where the expression for x(0) follows from the periodicity condition x(0) = x(T).
Using S(t)/(NR0) = ˙ x + Rx = x[R + ϕ(Ψ − x)], the normalized long-term proﬁt








(ξ − c)x[R + ϕ(Ψ − x)]dt.
Finally, in appendix A.1, a lengthy sequence of non-trivial transformations proves
that the Gˆ ateaux derivative of Π with respect to ξ is zero for all test directions ϑ,




Ψ′(ξ∗), where Ψ′ ≡ dΨ
dξ . In other words, the Euler-Lagrange equation for Π is
fulﬁlled for the constant price ξ∗, and hence ξ∗ is critical.
For the constant price to be a Nash equilibrium, the second variation of the long-
term proﬁt rate Π with respect to the price is required to be negative deﬁnite. To
show this, we need the following lemma, whose proof is given in appendix A.2.
Lemma 3.3. Let H : R → {0,1} be the Heaviside function. The following inequality











Under fairly mild conditions on the functions ϕ and Ψ at the critical point ξ∗ we
now obtain the optimality result. We will use the same abbreviations as in the
previous proof.
Proposition 3.4. Let the conditions of proposition 3.2 hold. Moreover, assume
R(ϕΨ)′ ≥ ΨΨ′ϕ2 at the constant critical price ξ∗. Then, for a feasible good, if
2(Ψ′(ξ∗))2 > Ψ′′(ξ∗)Ψ(ξ∗), a constant price is a (local) optimum for the monopoly.
Proof. Only the negative deﬁniteness of the second variation of Π with respect to























































Figure 1: Optimal aﬃne price evolution (left) as well as subpopulation (solid line)
and sales (dotted line) evolution (right) for parameter values R1 = 0.1R0,
T = 10/R0, r = 0, c1 = 0.1/Ξ1, and x1(0) = 0.001 (cf. example 3.2).
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0
ϑ2dt
for R(ϕΨ)′ ≥ Ψϕ2Ψ′. Hence, under the assumption 2(Ψ′)2 > Ψ′′Ψ (and Ψ′ < 0 and
Ψ ≥ 0 for a feasible product) we have the desired negative deﬁniteness.
The ﬁrst condition holds for R small enough, i.e. at least for long-lasting products,
the latter condition holds for instance for aﬃne Ψ. Hence it indeed makes sense for
some cases to reduce the complex price space R
[0,T]
+ by focussing on time-constant
prices.
For the issues dealt with so far, the general mathematical system was analytically
treatable. For other questions, we have to resort to speciﬁc examples in order
to obtain a qualitative insight into the characteristics of a market with habitual
imitative consumers. Clearly, in such cases it is instructive to consider only very
simple forms of s, ϕ, and especially ξ that just capture the necessary features for
the discussed problem at hand. In particular, aﬃne functions (the simplest case
possible) are well-suited to study trends (e.g. price trends). The following example
is meant to examine the optimal price trend for a good that is sold during a ﬁnite
time period. It illustrates that proposition 3.4 does not hold for bounded time
intervals.
Example 3.2 (Cumulated discounted proﬁt in a monopoly setting). For simplicity,
let us assume ϕ1 = s1 = 1 −
ξ1
Ξ1, and let us only allow for aﬃne price functions
ξ1( ) ∈ L([0,T]) := {f : [0,T] → R|∃a,b : f(t) = a + bt}. Consider the normalC. Matzke







exp[−rt](ξ1(t) − c1)S1 (s1(ξ1(t)),ϕ1(ξ1(t)),t)dt
 
.
For given parameters R1,T,r,c1,x1(0), the optimal price path ξ1(t) can be found
numerically (an analytical solution turns out to be too complex to provide any in-
sight). As a result, for a whole range of realistic parameters we obtain that the
product is initially sold below marginal cost, and then the price rises. One example
calculation is depicted in ﬁgure 1.
Of course, when r is chosen extremely large, this trend is reversed. However, this
only happens for values of r ∼ R0 to 2R0. This would correspond to an interest
rate of above 100% within the time R
−1
0 , i.e. if on average a consumer thinks of the
good only once a year, the interest rate would have to be above 100% per annum!
From this example, we may conclude that on a market with habitual imitative
consumers a beneﬁcial pricing strategy consists in starting at a low price and then
increasing the price steadily. It might even be advantageous to initially give away
products for free. The underlying idea is to initially strongly increase the market
share in order to exploit habitual behavior.
3.2. Oligopoly and polygopoly
In this section we turn to oligopoly and polygopoly markets. As for the monopoly,
we will begin with an introductory example and then prove a feasibility result
analogous to the result for a single ﬁrm. Afterwards, we examine the ﬁrms’ behavior
for an increasing number of competitors.
Example 3.3 (Steady state oligopoly prices). Consider the situation of exam-





choice renders the system analytically solvable and is an approximation to an aﬃne












If all n products are feasible, the steady state Nash equilibrium oligopoly prices ξ∗
i
can be computed analytically (cf. appendix A.4),
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where Λ is the inverse of matrix An, deﬁned as
(An)ij :=
 
1, j = i
Φj, j  = i
.
This example is one of the very few cases, where the optimal prices can indeed be
calculated analytically. It is not of great importance, but serves to illustrate few
general features of oligopoly markets. First of all, we observe that the reservation
prices Ξi and the marginal costs ci have a positive eﬀect on ξ∗
i . The reservation
price Ξi even acts as a kind of proportionality factor on ξ∗
i via the ﬁrst diagonal
matrix in equation (8). Also, due to 1 − Φi = Ri
R0(1 − si), the matrix entries and
hence the prices tend to inﬁnity as the habit factor si approaches one, the value
where consumers blindly purchase habitually. A further intuitive fact consists in the
shrinking signiﬁcance of the marginal costs with rising reservation price. Finally, let
us note that the diﬀerent good parameters Φi, ci, Ξi aﬀect all prices ξ∗
j,j = 1,...,n,
and not just the price of that good which they describe.
Let us now turn to the feasibility of goods in an oligopoly.
Proposition 3.5. Consider an n-product market with habitual imitative consumers
on which the products i, i = 1,...,n − 1, coexist with 0 < Φi < 1. Then product n
is feasible if and only if




where   ˜ x is the vector of market shares on the (n − 1)-goods market (i.e. without
product n) in the steady state and   ˜ ξ the corresponding price vector.
Proof. Due to condition 3.1, Ψn is monotonously decreasing with ξn. Also, Matzke
and Wirth (2008) have shown an nth product to be feasible on a market with
habitual imitative consumers, if and only if Ψn >   ˜ x     Φ. Let us assume, ˆ ξ is such
that Ψn[ˆ ξ] =   ˜ x     Φ(  ˜ ξ). Then, according to the result just cited, for ξn = ˆ ξ the
good does just not exist on the market so that the n-goods market behaves like the
(n − 1)-goods market and ﬁrms 1 to n − 1 choose the prices   ˜ ξ. If ˆ ξ is smaller than
cn, then due to condition 3.1, Ψn[ˆ ξ] is larger than Ψn[ξn] for ξn ≥ cn so that for a
proﬁtable price good n still does not persist on the market. If on the other hand ˆ ξ
is larger than cn, then by decreasing ξn a little (to which the other ﬁrms react by
choosing prices slightly diﬀerent from   ˜ ξ) we obtain a situation in which good n has
a non-zero market share and is sold above marginal costs.
According to Matzke and Wirth (2008), Ψn[ξn = cn] represents the hypothetic
monopoly market share when the price equals the marginal costs. Hence, intuitively,
the above proposition implies that this hypothetic monopoly market share has toC. Matzke
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be larger than the weighted sum of market shares of products 1 to n−1, where the
weights Φi ≤ 1 are the larger the stronger the corresponding goods induce habit.
Next, we shall study market implications from rising numbers of competitors. To
start with, let us return to example 3.3 with identical ﬁrms.
Proposition 3.6. In example 3.3, assume a symmetric oligopoly with n identical
ﬁrms, where each ﬁrm optimally chooses the same price ξ∗,n. Then, for an increas-
ing number of ﬁrms the price ξ∗,n decreases. In the limit n → ∞, it converges to
the marginal cost c.
Proof. Due to the symmetry of the market, we can skip the indices in equation (8).
Also, we readily verify Λij = −Φ
(1−Φ)(1+(n−1)Φ) for i  = j and Λii =
1+(n−2)Φ
(1−Φ)(1+(n−1)Φ)
so that equation (8) yields
ξ∗,n =
ΞΦ + (n − 1)c − (n − 2)c(1 − Φ)





















n + 1 + 2−3Φ
Φ       
=:C2≥−1
=
(n + C1)(n + C2)
(n + C1)
      
≥1
(n + C2)
      
≥0
+C1 − C2 − 1
.























Ξ + ξ∗,n + (Ψ[ξ∗,n] − 1)Ξ
= C1 − C2 − 1,
where in the last step we have used 1−Φ = (1−Ψ[ξ∗,n]) Ξ
Ξ+ξ∗,n. Together with the




Apparently, competition gets harder the more competitors coexist on the market.
In the limit, we obtain perfect competition. This result actually holds for more
general symmetric markets, which we will prove step by step. We will ﬁrst show
that steady state Nash equilibrium prices decrease for rising numbers n of ﬁrms.
Later we will analyze the limit n → ∞.
Lemma 3.7. Consider a symmetric oligopoly with n identical ﬁrms and with habit-
ual imitative consumers. Let Φ(ξ) and Ψ(ξ) be diﬀerentiable. Then, the derivative
of the steady state proﬁt rate Πn
i (of the ith ﬁrm in the n-goods market) with respect
to the price ξi (of the ith product), evaluated at the steady state Nash equilibrium






   
ξi=ξj=ξ∗,n−1
< 0.C. Matzke
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Proof. If all n products coexist on the market, mean dynamic (7) can be written as
An  x =   Ψ and the steady state proﬁt of ﬁrm i as
Πn
i = NRi(ξi − ci)xi = NRi(ξi − ci)Λi  Ψ,
with matrices An and Λ deﬁned as in example 3.3 and Λi being the ith row of Λ.







ΛijΨj + (ξi − ci)Λii
dΨi
dξi







Due to the market symmetry, we may write Ψi = Ψ, ξi = ξ, and ci = c. The
derivative
∂Λij
∂ξi at ξi = ξj = ξ can equivalently be computed as
∂˜ Λij
∂ξi , where ˜ Λ is the
inverse of matrix
( ˜ An)kl =

   
   
1, l = k,
Φ, l  = k,i,
Φi[ξi], l = i,l  = k.
We readily verify ˜ Λij = −Φ























(n − 1)ΦiΦ − (n − 2)Φ − 1
  





























We would like to show that this is negative at ξi = ξj = ξ∗,n−1, which is the Nash















ξi=ξj=ξ∗,n−1 = 0 for (ξ∗,n−1 − c), we obtain
ξ∗,n−1 − c = −
Ψ(1 − Φ)[1 + (n − 2)Φ]





























1 + (n − 1)Φ

1 −























This is indeed negative, since the fraction in brackets is larger than one: Due
to dΦ
dξ , dΨ
dξ < 0 (follows from condition 3.1), all summands in the numerator and
denominator are negative. Furthermore, the ﬁrst summand of the numerator isC. Matzke
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smaller (i.e. more negative) than the ﬁrst summand of the denominator. The same





The previous lemma now implies the desired result.
Proposition 3.8. Consider a symmetric oligopoly with n identical ﬁrms and with
habitual imitative consumers. Let Φ(ξ) and Ψ(ξ) be diﬀerentiable. If Φ(ξ) and
Ψ(ξ) are such that there exists exactly one steady state Nash equilibrium, then the
equilibrium price ξ∗,n decreases as the number of ﬁrms n rises.










since otherwise all ﬁrms would choose ξi = c as the unique Nash equilibrium price,
and ξ∗,n−1 must have been greater than or equal to marginal cost c so that the



















. Then f is continuous with
f(ξ∗,n−1) < 0 and f(c) ≥ 0 so that by Rolle’s theorem there exists a price ξ∗,n ∈
[c,ξ∗,n−1) with f(ξ∗,n) = 0 at which f changes sign to negative. Hence, ξ∗,n <
ξ∗,n−1 is a local maximizer of Πn
i and thus the unique Nash equilibrium price.
Hence, despite the consumers’ bounded rationality, our model has intuitive compet-
itive features and provides a foundation for perfect competitive equilibrium prices
as the number of ﬁrms tends to inﬁnity.
Next, we will prepare the second result, which shows that the prices of the weakest
products on the market converge against their marginal costs as the number of
competitors rises to inﬁnity. This holds for a general polygopoly and directly implies
that on the symmetric market all prices converge against marginal costs.
Lemma 3.9. Consider a polygopoly with n ﬁrms and with habitual imitative con-
sumers, where all n products coexist in the steady state Nash equilibrium. For given
n, let in denote the index of the “weakest” good, i.e. the one with lowest market
share xin = minj=1,...,n{xj} in the steady state Nash equilibrium. Let Φin(ξin) and
Ψin(ξin) be diﬀerentiable. If there is ν > 0 such that in the steady state Nash equi-
librium
∂xin
∂ξin < −ε < 0 for all n > ν, then as the number of ﬁrms n tends to inﬁnity,
the price of good in converges to marginal cost, i.e. (ξ
∗,n
in −cin) → 0. xin shall here
be understood as the steady state market share.C. Matzke
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Proof. The steady state proﬁt rate of good in is given by Πn





























where ξj = ξ
∗,n
j indicates evaluation at the steady state Nash equilibrium prices.
For a contradiction, assume there exists δ > 0 such that for all   > ν there is
n( ) >   with (ξ
∗,n








































in − cin) ≥ 0, we ﬁnally ﬁnd limn→∞(ξ
∗,n
in − cin) = 0.
This lemma is almost what we aimed at, however, it depends on conditions on state
variables (
∂xin
∂ξin < −ε) which might not be satisﬁed. A shrinking market share for
rising prices is indeed economically plausible but not necessarily true. Hence, we
would like to express all conditions in terms of the control variables Φi and Ψi, for
which we need the following lemma, whose proof is given in appendixA.5.




1, i = j,
Φj, i  = j,
i,j = 1...n.
Then,
Λii ≥ 1 and Λij ≤ 0 for all i,j = 1,...,n with i  = j.
Now we can prove an estimate for the change of market shares.
Lemma 3.11. Consider a polygopoly with n ﬁrms and with habitual imitative con-
sumers, where all n products coexist in the steady state Nash equilibrium. Let Φi(ξi)


















for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where xi is understood as the steady state market share.
Proof. Without loss of generality let i = 1. Also, in the following, let all parameters,
equations, and derivatives be evaluated at the steady state Nash equilibrium (i.e. atC. Matzke
B. Wirth Product Pricing when Demand Follows a Rule of Thumb 19
ξj = ξ
∗,n
j ). Then, mean dynamic (7) yields An  x =   Ψ, which can be diﬀerentiated
with respect to ξ1 to give
∂An
∂ξ1






















































which together with the previous lemma and ∂Ψ1
∂ξ1 , ∂Φ1
∂ξ1 ≤ 0 (due to condition 3.1)
yields the desired result.
The previous lemma can be interpreted as follows: The change of steady state
market shares xi is larger than the change of the corresponding“product qualities”
Ψi, i.e. shares are quite sensitive to quality changes. Lemmata 3.9 and 3.11 can
now be combined to yield the following.
Proposition 3.12. Consider a polygopoly with n ﬁrms and habitual imitative con-
sumers, where all n products coexist in the steady state Nash equilibrium. For given
n, let in denote the index of the “weakest” good, i.e. the one with lowest market
share xin=minj=1,...,n{xj}. Let Φin(ξin) and Ψin(ξin) be diﬀerentiable. If there is
ν> 0 such that
∂Ψin
∂ξin




<−ε<0 for all n>ν, then as the number of ﬁrms tends
to inﬁnity, the price of good in converges to marginal cost, i.e. (ξ
∗,n
in −cin)→0. ￿
The proof of this result can inductively be repeated for the second“weakest”good,
the third “weakest”one, and so on up to the mth “weakest”good, where m is any
positive integer.
Corollary 3.13. Consider a polygopoly with n ﬁrms and let the assumptions from
proposition 3.12 hold. As the number of ﬁrms tends to inﬁnity, the m “weakest”
products’ prices converge to their marginal costs, where m is any positive integer.￿
As a consequence, since on a symmetric market any good is the “weakest”one, the
prices of all goods converge to marginal costs. In general, however, there may be
products so superior to the rest of the market that their prices stay away from
marginal costs while all other prices converge against marginal costs. The proof of
lemma 3.9 can be slightly adapted to show that this may only be true for a ﬁnite
number of products.C. Matzke









Figure 2: An arbitrary imitation function, plotted as normalized inverse demand
function. The consumer surplus equals CSi = κi
ϕ∗
i Si, and the producer
surplus is given by PSi = ιi
ϕ∗
i Si, where ξ∗
i denotes the current price of
product i and ϕ∗
i = ϕi(ξ∗
i ) is the resulting imitation coeﬃcient.
4. Extensions: Welfare, product life cycle generation,
and advertising
To point into possible directions of further research we will brieﬂy discuss three
supplements to our model as there are welfare, the generation of product life cycles,
and advertising.
4.1. A welfare deﬁnition
In the following, we shall propose a suitable welfare deﬁnition for our setting to
allow for theories of social implications. The producer surplus can be calculated
as usual from the Marshallian deﬁnition, whereas the consumer surplus has to be
obtained diﬀerently as a consequence of the non-standard consumer behavior.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Welfare). Given the imitation function ϕi(ξi) for good i, the contri-
bution of that good to the producer and consumer surplus at time t can be calculated
as


















PSi(t) + CSi(t). (11)
For a single good with an arbitrary imitation function, consumer and producer
surplus at a speciﬁc time are illustrated in ﬁgure 2. Before further motivation, note
that the imitation function ϕi(ξi) can be interpreted as the demand distribution
for good i. In other words, for a consumer the probability P to have a reservation
price ξ
rp
i for good i larger than or equal to some price ξ∗
i is given by the demandC. Matzke









Phrased diﬀerently, the imitation function ϕi(ξi) constitutes the probability distri-
bution of the reservation price ξ
rp
i of a set of heterogeneous consumers, and the
reservation price ξ
rp
i is distributed according to the density −
dϕi(ξi)
dξi . (If instead
we assume ﬁckle homogeneous consumers, where each individual’s reservation price
changes from time to time, ϕi(ξi) can be interpreted as the reservation price prob-
ability of a single consumer.) Against this background, the following alternative
characterization of the consumer surplus may serve as motivation.
Proposition 4.1. Let ϕi(ξi)ξi → 0 for ξi → ∞, and let ξ∗
i be the current price of
product i and ϕ∗
i = ϕi(ξ∗
i ) the resulting imitation coeﬃcient. Let the consumers’
reservation price ξ
rp
i for good i have probability density −
dϕi(ξi)
dξi








(i) Pick one consumer arbitrarily and give her the option to buy either product
i or none. The expected value of her utility, Ui = max(ξ
rp
i − ξ∗







(For simplicity, we here also allow inﬁnite values of the expected utility.)
(ii) Pick one consumer, who has reservation price ξ
rp
i ≥ ξ∗
i , i.e. who would buy






(iii) Assume that those consumers who actually buy product i are uniformly dis-
tributed among all potential buyers (i.e. those with ξ
rp
i ≥ ξ∗
i ), then the expected
consumer surplus is given by



































































Ui is a so-called integrable random variable, if and only if ϕi ∈ L1([0,∞)) (in
which case the integral is bounded).C. Matzke
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(ii) The consumers with ξ
rp
i ≥ ξ∗
i make up ϕi(ξ∗
i ) of the total population. Among
them, ξ
rp
i is distributed according to
P[ξ
rp
i ≥ ξ] =
 






i ) , else,




(iii) By a change of variables ϕ = ϕi(ξ
rp
































which together with the deﬁnition of CSi yields the desired result.
Our deﬁnition thus resembles the standard approach: CSi approximates the diﬀer-
ence between average reservation price among all buyers and the actual price.
As a brief application, we show that for a symmetric oligopoly, the welfare rises
with the number of ﬁrms.
Proposition 4.2. Consider a symmetric oligopoly with n identical ﬁrms and with
habitual imitative consumers. Let ϕ(ξ) and s(ξ) be diﬀerentiable and such that
there exists exactly one steady state Nash equilibrium with equilibrium price ξ∗,n. If
the total steady state sales nSn :=
 n
i=1 Si(ξ∗,n) increase more strongly in n than






dn /ϕ∗,n, then the welfare increases for a
rising number of ﬁrms.
Proof. As before, since all ﬁrms are identical we skip the indices. As illustrated in
ﬁgure 2, the welfare is given by nS
n












which is larger than 0 by assumption. Also, ξ∗,n decreases for a rising number of
ﬁrms by proposition 3.8, and hence, κ+ι increases due to the monotonicity of ϕ(ξ)
(condition 3.1). Altogether, the welfare rises for rising n.
Apparently, despite the consumers’ bounded rationality, we obtain the standard
result of an increasing welfare. This implies a certain amount of market eﬃciency,
comparable to a market with rational consumers.
4.2. The generation of product life cycles
In this paragraph, we brieﬂy illustrate how a realistic product life cycle may emerge
from our model. As a simple example, consider a consecutive introduction of manyC. Matzke
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Figure 3: Product life cycles (left) when many products enter the market succes-
sively and the maximum reservation price Ξi of each product decreases in
time (right). In this simulation we chose ϕi(ξi) = si(ξi) = 1 −
ξi
Ξi with
maximum reservation price Ξi = Ξ
1+αR0(t−ti), α = 5   10−2. Furthermore,
we have a time interval T = 6
R0 between the introduction of products,
an alarm clock rate Ri = 0.025R0 for all goods, an initial subpopulation
xi(0) = 10−3, and constant product prices ξi = 0.1Ξ.
products, all competing with each other. Think for instance of the mobile phone
market, where new (innovative) mobile phones frequently enter the market. The
maximum reservation price for a product may be assumed highest at its introduction
on the market when it still represents the state of the art, and then it decreases in
time, as innovation goes on. Hence, also habit and imitation function are highest
at the time of product introduction.
The most simple setting is to assume ﬁxed prices ξi, simple imitation and habit
functions ϕi(ξi) = si(ξi) = 1 −
ξi
Ξi, new product introductions equally distributed
over time, and a simple evolution of the maximum reservation price Ξi in time,
e.g. Ξi = Ξ
1+αR0(t−ti), where ti is the time of introduction of product i. Figure 3
shows the resulting product life cycles of the successively introduced products, ob-
tained from an exemplary simulation.
Notice the classical pattern with a gentle increase of the sales right after product
launch, a broad maturity period and a quite steep decline until the product vanishes
(cf. for example de Kluyver (1977), Polli and Cook (1969) and others).
4.3. Marketing strategies: Advertisement
In section 2.2, in order to employ speciﬁc switching probabilities, we used the mech-
anism of imitation (4), that is, the probability of buying good i is proportional to
the amount xi of people who already own it. xi may here be interpreted as the
probability that the consumer gets to know the product from other consumers. The
multiplicative imitation factor ϕi represents how strongly the consumer is convinced
to buy the good when she knows it. However, consumers can also get to know the
good via advertisements, which constitute an eﬀective tool for ﬁrms to inﬂuence
the consumers’ buying behavior. The probability to see the product’s commer-
cial is given by ai ∈ [0,1], where ai depends positively on the advertising budget.
The overall probability to become aware of product i (via commercials or otherC. Matzke
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consumers) hence is ai + xi − aixi so that (4) and (6) change to
p0i = ϕi(xi + ai − xiai), i  = 0, (12)
pij = (1 − si)ϕj(xj + aj − xjaj), i  = 0 ∧ j  = 0,i. (13)
For the same motivation as in section 2.2, equation (5) remains unchanged,
pii = si ∈ [0,1], i  = 0. (14)
We shall in the following always assume ϕi,si > 0. An interesting question would be
whether a non-feasible product can be made feasible by advertising. The following
lemma provides an answer for a single good market (where we disregard advertising
costs and only examine whether a demand for that good exists).
Proposition 4.3. The single product on a market with habitual imitative consumers
is always feasible if it is advertised, i.e. a1 > 0.
Proof. The mean dynamic for the single good market takes the form
˙ x1 = ϕ1R0(x1 + a1 − x1a1) + x1(R1s1 − ϕ1R0(x1 + a1 − x1a1)) − R1x1
= x1ϕ1R0[Ψ1 − 2a1 − x1(1 − a1)] + ϕ1R0a1.










2−2a1 , a1  = 1,
which is positive for a1 > 0, irrespective of the value of Ψ1.
Apparently, commercials help the good to survive on the market. This statement
is illustrated in ﬁgure 4 where the steady state market share is shown for diﬀerent
advertising levels. For a positive level, the market share is always positive and hence
the product feasible.
Note that in proposition 4.3 we only consider the demand side of the market, i.e. we
examine whether the product is demanded by consumers in the steady state. We
ignore that the ﬁrm might not be able to operate in the black because of immense
advertising costs.
An analogous result can be shown for an oligopoly.
Proposition 4.4. On an n-product market with habitual imitative consumers, prod-
uct i is always feasible if it is advertised, i.e. ai > 0 (unless there is a good j with
Φj = 1).C. Matzke
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Figure 4: Stable steady state value of the market share x1 for diﬀerent advertising
levels a1.
Proof. The mean dynamic reads
˙ xi = ϕiR0xi
 

















For xi = 0 we obtain ˙ xi > 0. Hence, the system trajectory can never approach
xi = 0 so that the market share of product i always stays strictly away from zero.
An advertising campaign is usually associated with costs that depend on its reach.
Let us therefore introduce advertising costs ca
i for good i. Obviously, the derivative
∂ai
∂ca
i has to be non-negative. With this altered model at hand, various simulations can
be performed for speciﬁc functions ϕi(ξi), si(ξi) and ai(ca
i ). One could for instance
examine the product feasibility including advertising costs, whether advertising is
proﬁtable at all, how large ai should optimally be, or whether there is a threshold
value for xi above which advertising is no longer beneﬁcial. For illustration, we pick
up example 3.2 and add advertising. We will compute the optimal aﬃne pricing
and advertising strategy. Before, however, we need to extend the deﬁnition of the
normal form competition game.
With advertising, ﬁrms have a second strategic variable besides their product’s
price which represents the advertising expenses. Hence, the set S of all pos-
sible strategy combinations now is a subset of the space of n-tuples over maps
(ξi,ca
i) : R+ → R2









R+ × ... × (R2
+)
R+.
The components of proﬁt Π : S → Rn







  s(  ξ(t)),   ϕ(  ξ(t)),  a(  ca(t)),t
 
−   ca(t)
 
, where   S(  s(  ξ(t)),   ϕ(  ξ(t)),  a(  ca(t)),t)
denotes the sales vector produced by the population game including advertising ac-
cording to equations (12) and (13).
Example 4.1 (Cumulated discounted proﬁt in a monopoly setting with advertis-
ing). For simplicity, let us assume ϕ1 = s1 = 1 −
ξ1
Ξ1 and a1 = 1
1+K/ca
1 , and let us
only allow for aﬃne price and advertising cost functions ξ1( ),ca
1( ) ∈ L([0,T]) :=











For given parameters R1,T,r,c1,x1(0), the optimal price paths ξ1(t) and ca
1(t) canC. Matzke





































Figure 5: Optimal aﬃne price evolution (left) and optimal aﬃne advertising ex-
penses (middle), as well as subpopulation (solid line) and sales (dotted
line) evolution (right) for parameter values R1 = 0.1R0, T = 10/R0,
r = 0, c1 = 0.1/Ξ1, K = 2   10−6, x1(0) = 0 (cf. example 4.1).
be found numerically. As a result, for a whole range of realistic parameters we
obtain the reverse of example 3.2: The price decreases with time. One example
calculation is depicted in ﬁgure 5.
Apparently, a ﬁrm is recommended to start an advertising campaign in parallel to
the product launch and steadily decrease the product price as well as the adver-
tising expenses during the lifespan of the product. Due to the initial advertising,
the market share is rapidly increased with brute force. Via the subsequent price
decrease, habit purchases can be kept on a high level, and reluctant customers are
attracted. Thereby, the market is optimally exploited by initially letting customers
with a high reservation price pay high prices and only later reducing the price to
make people with low reservation prices buy the product (similarly to the concept of
price discrimination). Advertising becomes less crucial when the market share has
already reached a certain level (the product sells itself) and is therefore reduced.
5. Conclusion
We examined the optimal strategic pricing for ﬁrms when the demand evolution
is generated by the behavior of boundedly rational consumers who follow a rule
of thumb and base their decisions on imitation and habit. The demand dynamic
is described within the framework of a population game with associated switching
probabilities, and it serves as a basis for strategic pricing of a monopoly or oligopoly
in a diﬀerential game. The optimal price paths correspond to Nash equilibria of a
normal form competition game.
The modeling approach is supported by psychological and experimental studies, and
the introduced methodology allows for broad applications and qualitative theoretical
analysis.
We investigated product feasibility (i.e. the conditions under which ﬁrms operate
proﬁtably in the long-term) and expressed it with the help of the hypothetical
popularity of the product if it was sold for a price equal to the marginal cost.
Furthermore, we showed that markets with habitual imitative consumers are in a
sense well-behaved: For a rising number of ﬁrms, the prices decrease, the prices ofC. Matzke
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the weakest products (but not necessarily of all products) converge against marginal
costs, and the welfare rises (at least for a symmetric market). Such results (despite
the boundedly rational consumer behavior) prove once more the existence of some
kind of eﬃciency in not totally rational markets.
We also proved for the monopoly that under certain conditions, Nash equilibria are
found in the strategy space of all time-constant price paths so that a reduction of
the (quite complex and untractable) strategy space of all possible price paths is at
least sometimes sensible.
Finally, the assumed boundedly rational consumer behavior was shown to lead to
observed market patterns such as product life cycles, and extensions to the model
were proposed and examined such as an adequate deﬁnition of welfare, which allows
for analysis of social implications, and the introduction of advertising, which allows





























































A.1. Criticality of a constant monopoly price (Proposition 3.2)
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Using the price ξ implicitly deﬁned by ξ − c = −Ψ(ξ)/Ψ′(ξ) (which follows from maximizing the proﬁt for a constant price and a steady state,
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A.2. Proof of lemma 3.3
Proof. For Lebesgue-integrable functions ϑ,θ, let us deﬁne the bilinear forms





ϑ(t)θ(τ)exp[α(τ − t + TH(t − τ))]dτdt






For ϑ ∈ L1([0,T])\L2([0,T]),  ϑ,ϑ R is unbounded so that  ϑ,ϑ L ≤  ϑ,ϑ R triv-
ially. Hence, let us assume ϑ ∈ L2([0,T]) from now on.
  ,  L and   ,  R are (sequentially) continuous in both arguments in L2([0,T]): Let
θk
k→∞ −→ θ in L2([0,T]). By H¨ ı£¡lder’s inequality and the continuous Sobolev em-
bedding L2([0,T]) ֒→ L1([0,T]),
| ϑ,θ R− ϑ,θk R| =
 







   
 
 
≤ ||ϑ||L2||θ − θk||L2
k→∞ −→ 0
| ϑ,θ L− ϑ,θk L| =
 
 


















= e|αT|||ϑ||L1||θ − θk||L1 ≤ C||ϑ||L2||θ − θk||L2
k→∞ −→ 0
for some constant C. Continuity in the ﬁrst argument follows analogously. By
 








  θ,θk L/R −  θk,θk L/R
 
  k→∞ −→ 0
we immediately have continuity of ϑ  →  ϑ,ϑ L/R.






   N ∈ N,ai ∈ R
 
. The lemma then follows by the above-shown
continuity and the density of regular step functions in L2([0,T]): It is well-known
that step functions are dense in L2([0,T]), so density of T in the space of step
functions remains to be shown. Let f =
 n−1














lie completely in an interval [ti,ti+1]. This is not the case for a maximum number




k T]. Hence, ||fk − f||L2 ≤ nT
k (maxi,j |bi − bj|)2 k→∞ −→ 0.





N T] and assume α  = 0. Then,
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N T, i > j,
−eα
N+i−j








, i = j.











T ≤ 0 ⇔ aAa





































1 − eα T
N
= Bii,
and thus by Gershgorin’s theorem, B is positive semi-deﬁnite. For α = 0, the






















































































[R + ϕ(Ψ − 2x)]ϑ + x[(ϕΨ)′ − xϕ′]ϑϑ +
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A.4. Oligopoly price for example 3.3
Proof. Let An and Λ = (A−1
n ) be as in example 3.3. Furthermore, let us write
vectors (ai)i=1,...,n as  a and diagonal n×n matrices with diagonal entries (ai)i=1,...,n
as ¯ a. If all n goods coexist on the market, then for the steady state the mean
dynamic (7) can be rewritten as
  Ψ = An  x.
According to equation (3), the sales   S and the proﬁt   Π then adopt the form
  S = N ¯ R  x = N ¯ RA−1
n   Ψ and   Π = (Ξ − ¯ c)  S = (Ξ − ¯ c)N ¯ RA−1
n   Ψ.
Letting (A−1
n )i denote the ith row of matrix A−1
n , the Nash equilibrium is found by
















, i = 1,...,n,






dξi . For the system to be analytically solv-
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= 0, i = 1,...,n.



















































which directly implies the solution for the optimal prices   ξ∗.C. Matzke
B. Wirth Product Pricing when Demand Follows a Rule of Thumb 35
A.5. Proof of lemma 3.10


















for any m > 0 and 0 < αi < 1, i = 1,...,m, which we will need later.





where (An)i→ej denotes matrix An with the ith column replaced by the jth unit
vector ej. For i  = j, using Laplace expansion along the ith column and subsequent
column and row interchanges of the (i,j)-minor matrix of An, we obtain
det(An)i→ej = −detB0,




















































































In order to show detB0 ≤ 0, let us deﬁne Bt for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 by replacing the (1,1)-
entry in B0 by Φj + t(1 − Φj). Now, t  → detBt is continuous with detB1 > 0 due
to (15). Hence, if we had detB0 < 0, then by Rolle’s theorem there would be some
t ∈ (0,1) with detBt = 0. However,




















which due to (15) is larger than zero, since 0 <
Φj
Φj+t(1−Φj) < 1. This contradicts
detBt = 0 so that our initial assumption detB0 < 0 is wrong. Also, we have
detAn > 0 due to (15) so that ﬁnally, Λij = −detB0
detAn ≤ 0. Moreover, from 1 =C. Matzke
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 n
j=1 Λij(An)ji = Λii +
 
j =i Λij(An)ji ≤ Λii we obtain Λii ≥ 1.
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